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COMMENT
THE FIFTH AMENDMENT AND THE PRODUCTION OF
DOCUMENTS: A NEW RATIONALE
During its last term, the Supreme Court decided two cases involving the
production of documents and papers; one involved the use of a search
warrant,' the other a subpoena duces tecum. 2 Both cases raised the fifth
amendment issues.' In both instances, the Supreme Court found no viola-
tion of the privilege against self-incrimination.4
This comment will examine the history of the privilege as applied in
cases involving the production of documents. It will set forth the rationale
that seems to have emerged in the recent decisions and will note how the
current rationale differs from the principles utilized in the earlier cases.
Finally, the comment will analyze the scope of the decisions.
BACKGROUND AND HISTORY
The fifth amendment right against self-incrimination evolved "as an
essential part of due process and as a fundamental principle of liberty and
justice."5 Its basic purpose was to overcome inquisitions, eliminate coerced
confessions' and prevent abuses of power by law enforcement officials. 7 It
was based on the evolving principles of Magna Carta and the English
common law,8 the common laws court drawing no distinction between
compelled oral testimony and the forced production of written documents
In America, the privilege was extended to private papers and documents
by the Supreme Court's decision in Boyd v. United States.'0 In a civil suit
for forfeiture agains t the members of a partnership, an order was issued to
claimants to produce an invoice indicating the quantity and value of
1. Andresen v. Maryland, 96 S. Ct. 2737 (1976).
2. Fisher v. United States, 96 S. Ct. 1569 (1976).
3. The fifth amendment states in pertinent part: "No person. . . shall be compelled in
any criminal case to be a witness against himself.... "U.S. CONST. amend. V.
4. Andresen v. Maryland, 96 S. Ct. 2737, 2747 (1976); Fisher v. United States, 96 S. Ct.
1569, 1582 (1976).
5. L. LEVY, JUDGMENTs 268 (1972).
6. Id. at 269.
7. Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 428 (1956).
8. L. Lavy, JUDGMENTS 267 (1972).
9. 3 HoFsRA L. Rav. 467 (1975).
10. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
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thirty-five cases of plate glass." The claimants obeyed the order, but ob-
jected on fifth amendment grounds to admission of the invoice into evi-
dence.' 2 Merging the protections of the fourth and fifth amendments on the
theory that the seizure of a man's private papers to be used in evidence
against him was virtually equivalent to compelling him to be a witness
against himself,' 3 the Court held that the statute" providing for the order
was unconstitutional.'5 Therefore, the admission of the invoice into evi-
dence violated the claimant's fourth and fifth amendment rights." While
there was no blatant intrusion upon the claimant's constitutional rights,
the principles of the amendments were said to apply to all invasions "of
the sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life" by the government
or its employees. 7 The Court noted that if the constitutional provisions
were not liberally construed, they would lose their vitality.'8 The language
of Boyd was broad and far-reaching and was intended to deter the slightest
encroachment on an individual's rights.'9
11. Id. at 618.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 633. The merger of the fourth and fifth amendments is known as the "conver-
gence theory." Justice Bradley borrowed the idea from the language of the English case of
Entuck v. Carrington, 19 How. St. Tr. 1029 (1765). Justice Bradley stated that:
[Any forcible and compulsory extortion of a man's own testimony or of his private
papers to be used as evidence to convict him of crime or to forfeit his goods, is within
the condemnation of that judgment. In this regard the Fourth and Fifth Amendments
run almost into each other.
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886).
He noted further that:
'[U]nreasonable searches and seizures' condemned in the Fourth Amendment are
almost always made for the purpose of compelling a man to give evidence against
himself, which in criminal cases is condemned in the Fifth Amendment; and compel-
ling a man 'in a criminal case to be a witness against himself,' which is condemned in
the Fifth Amendment, throws light on the question as to what is an 'unreasonable
search and seizure' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
Id. at 633.
14. The statute provided that if the defendant or claimant failed to produce the "book,
invoice, or paper" upon notice from the court, "the allegations stated in the said motion shall
be taken as confessed, unless his failure or refusal to produce the same shall be explained to
the satisfaction of the court." Id. at 620. Justice Bradley held that this provision was tanta-
mount to forcing the defendant or claimant to be a witness against himself. Id. at 635.
15. Id. at 638.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 630.
18. Id. at 635. Justice Bradley felt that, the courts must be the watchdog of the constitu-
tional rights of the citizen. He expressed some doubt about the competence of the legislature
to discern future constitutional problems with a particular statute. Id.
19. Id. at 624. However, property rights dominated the Court's inquiry into the constitu-
tional issues. The Court recognized that there are instances where the government has a
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The fast growth and increasing complexity of the business world, which
accompanied the twentieth century, necessitated the passage of regulatory
legislation, such as the Sherman Anti-Trust Act.2 The Court was soon
faced with determining whether the privilege against self-incrimination
would apply to a corporation, 2' which the Sherman Act expressly deemed
to be a person entitled to the same immunities as an individual. 22 The
Court held that there was a clear distinction between a natural individual
and a corporate2 or other collective entity.Y The fifth amendment protec-
tion against self-incrimination was held to be available only to the person
against whom disclosure was sought,2 not to a third party, even if he were
the agent of that person.26 An officer of a corporation who might be incrimi-
nated by the contents of corporate documents could not claim the fifth
amendment privilege,2 neither could a sole shareholder who contended
that the corporate papers and books were his individual property.? Be-
cause legal title to these documents was in the corporation, 2 they were held
subject to examination by virtue of their character and the rules of law
applicable to them."
This reasoning was also applied to unincorporated associations, such as
labor unions3' and partnerships.32 If an organization had a character so
superior interest and is entitled to the property in question, such as in the case of seizure of
stolen goods or required records open to the inspection of the revenue officers. Id.
20. 15 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (1970).
21. Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361 (1911); McAlister v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 90 (1906);
Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906).
22. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 7, 12 (1970).
23. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 74-75 (1906).
24. Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 371-72 (1951); United States v. White, 322 U.S.
694, 704 (1944).
25. McAlister v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 90, 91 (1906).
26. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 69-70 (1906); McAlister v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 90,91 (1906).
27. Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 380-82 (1911). The Court noted, however, that
the privilege would protect an officer against the compulsory production of his private books
and papers. Id. at 378.
28. Grant v. United States, 227 U.S. 74 (1913). The defendant shareholder contended that
the papers and books were his individual property and that to disclose their contents or
whereabouts or to produce them would tend to incriminate him. The Court rejected this
contention, holding that the legal title to the books and papers was in the corporation, so that
the fifth amendment privilege was not available to the defendant under the holding in Wilson.
Id. at 80. If the principles of Boyd had not been circumscribed by Wilson, this result would
not have been reached because of the close personal identification between the defendant and
the corporation, a relationship that served as the basis of the holding in Boyd. See generally
3 HOFSTRA L. Rlv. 467, 474 (1975).
29. Grant v. United States, 227 U.S. 74, 77 (1913).
30. See Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 382 (1911).
31. United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694 (1944).
32. Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85 (1974). See generally 39 ALBANY L. REv. 545 (1975);
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impersonal that it could not be said to embody or represent the purely
private or personal interests of its members, the fifth amendment privilege
was not available to it or its representatives in their official capacity." An
individual who held the records of an unincorporated association was pre-
sumed to be acting in a purely representative capacity34 and could not
claim his personal privilege for the association's records.
If a statute requires that records be maintained to aid in regulatory
programs," these records fall outside the protection of the fifth amendment
because of their public character." However, the Supreme Court has been
hesitant to expand the required records doctrine,37 and in fact has limited
it to records of a type usually kept for non-criminal regulatory purposes.,
In Couch v. United States,39 the Court was presented with the docu-
ments question in a slightly different context. The Court held that the
3 HOFSTRA L. REv. 467 (1975). In Bellis the institutional identity of the partnership was
analogized to that of the labor union in White. "While small, the partnership did have an
established institutional identity independent of its individual partners." 417 U.S. at 85.
Many factors, such as the state partnership statutes, partnership employees, separate part-
nership checking accounts, separate partnership tax returns for federal tax purposes and the
fact that the state regards a partnership as a distinct entity for numerous purposes, led to
this conclusion. Id. at 95-97. This identity was stressed as the important factor in determining
whether the privilege would be available to the partnership. The Court refused to decide
whether the same result would have been reached if a small family partnership had been
involved or if there were some other pre-existing relationship among the partners. Id. at 101.
The Court distinguished its decision as to partnerships in this case from that in Boyd,
which also involved a partnership, by stating:
[Alt [the Boyd] stage in the development of our Fifth Amendment jurisprudence,
the potential significance of this fact [of partnership] was not observed by either of
the parties or the Court. The parties treated the invoice at issue as a private business
record, and the contention that it might be a partnership record held in a representa-
tive capacity, and thus not within the scope of the privilege, was not raised. The Court
therefore decided the case on the premise that it involved the 'compulsory production
of a man's private papers.' . . . It was only after Boyd had held that the Fifth Amend-
ment privilege applied to the compelled production of documents that the question of
the extension of this principle to the records of artificial entities arose. We do not
believe that the Court in Boyd can be said to have decided the issue presented today.
Id. at 95 n.2 (citations omitted).
33. United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 701 (1944).
34. See 39 ALBANY L. REv. 545, 553-54 (1975).
35. Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1 (1948). In this case, records were required to be
kept by the Emergency Price Control Act.
36. Id. at 33-34. See Note, The Taxpayer's Expectation of Privacy as a Bar to Production
of Records Held By His Attorney, 16 WM. & MARY L. Rv. 666, 691-92 (1975).
37. The Supreme Court has not yet applied Shapiro to tax records, although several lower
courts have. 16 WM. & MARY L. REv. 666, supra note 36, at 692.
38. See Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 57 (1968).
39. 409 U.S. 322 (1973).
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protection of the fifth amendment was not available to a taxpayer who
asserted her privilege to avoid the production of her business records by
her accountant." Finding neither a legitimate expectation of privacy in the
records4 nor any semblance of governmental compulsion against the ac-
cused, 2 the Court enforced the production of the documents. Possession,
rather than ownership,4 3 of the documents sought "bears the closest rela-
tionship to the personal compulsion forbidden by the Fifth Amendment.""
In dictum, the Court noted that constructive possession or temporary di-
vestment of possession may leave the compulsion on the accused substan-
tially intact."
These decisions have sharply narrowed the principles of Boyd.
Collectively, the cases indicate that the fifth amendment privilege can
only be claimed by an individual holding documents in a private or per-
sonal capacity. The Court has disregarded its own admonition that the
fifth amendment must be liberally construed to prevent a gradual deterio-
ration of its protection. The amendment has been construed literally, not
liberally, in the last several years.47
40. Id. at 335-36. The Internal Revenue Service issued a summons to the taxpayer's
accountant for the production of the records of the taxpayer's business, a sole proprietorship.
rd. at 324. For the statute authorizing the issuance of an IRS summons, see INT. Rv. CODE
OF 1954, § 7602. For a discussion of the use of the summons, see Donaldson v. United States,
400 U.S. 517 (1971), where the Court held that:
Congress clearly has authorized the use of the summons in investigating what may
prove to be criminal conduct .... There is no statutory suggestion for any meaningful
line of distinction, for civil as compared with criminal purposes, at the point of a
special agent's appearance .... To draw a line where a special agent appears would
require the Service, in a situation of suspected but undetermined fraud, to forego either
the use of the summons or the potentiality of an ultimate recommendation for prosecu-
tion. We refuse'to draw that line and thus to stultify enforcement of federal law.
Id. at 535-36 (citations omitted), quoted in Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 326 (1973).
41. 409 U.S. at 335. See generally Note, The Fifth Amendment and the Production of
Records: Are Ownership and Possession Always Necessary?, 9 GA. L. REv. 658 (1975).
42. 409 U.S. at 336.
43. See 9 GA. L. REV. 658 (1975), supra note 41, for a discussion of the role of ownership
and possession in invoking the fifth amendment in cases involving the production of docu-
ments.
44. 409 U.S. at 331.
45. Id. at 333.
46. See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1886).
47. While the basic fifth amendment premises in Boyd, as applied to documents, were
being narrowed, another body of law involving the fifth amendment was developing. See
United States v. Mara, 410 U.S. 79 (1973); United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1 (1973);
Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967);
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966). These decisions concerned use of identifying
physical characteristics of an accused. Generally, they held that such use was outside the
protection of the fifth amendment and distinguished physical and testimonial evidence. See
1977]
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Fisher v. United States" involved two circuit court decisions 9 with al-
most identical fact situations. In both cases Internal Revenue agents had
contacted taxpayers in connection with an investigation. Later, the tax-
payers retained attorneys and obtained their accountants' work papers,
turning them over to the attorneys to use in representing them. The agents
issued documentary summonses to the attorneys, both of whom refused to
produce the specified documents." The third5' and fifth" circuits reached
different results, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve this
conflict. 53
e.g., Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966), where the Court stated that the fifth
amendment "protects an accused only from being compelled to testify against himself, or
otherwise provide the State with evidence of a testimonial or communicative nature ......
Id. at 761.
48. 96 S. Ct. 1569 (1976).
49. United States v. Fisher, 500 F.2d 683 (3d Cir. 1974); United States v. Kasmir, 499 F.2d
444 (5th Cir. 1974).
50. Fisher v. United States, 96 S. Ct. 1569, 1572-73 (1976); United States v. Fisher, 500
F.2d 683, 685-86 (3d Cir. 1974); United States v. Kasmir, 499 F.2d 444 (5th Cir. 1974).
51. United States v. Fisher, 500 F.2d 683 (3d Cir. 1974). The Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit held that the clients' fifth amendment privilege was not available to the attor-
ney unless the taxpayers could prove that their brief possession of the accountant's records
before delivering them to the attorney had created a right of constructive possession. Id. at
692. The court noted that the taxpayers should not lose their privilege because they surren-
dered actual possession to the attorney if they could have successfully resisted the summons
because the documents were in a "rightful personally private possession." Id. at 689. The
court found that the taxpayers' possession of the documents had been "temporary and insig-
nificant" and therefore did not give rise to the necessary element of personal compulsion. Id.
at 691. Compelled incrimination is what the fifth amendment prohibits. The privilege is not
equated with ownership. Elements of ownership, possession and expectation of privacy are
"effective as jurisprudential tools . . . [but] are not, in and of themselves, controlling." Id.
at 689-90.
52. United States v. Kasmir, 499 F.2d 444 (5th Cir. 1974). The Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit held that had the taxpayer retained possession of the documents, he could have
asserted his fifth amendment privilege. Id. at 452-53. Because of the confidential nature of
the attorney-client relationship, he had a legitimate expectation of privacy as to the docu-
ments transferred to the attorney pursuant to that relationship. The taxpayer has different
expectations when he transfers documents to an attorney than he does when he transfers them
to an accountant. The accountant is under a legal duty to disclose at least some of the
information while the attorney has an ethical obligation to prevent disclosures of confidential
material. While the taxpayers retained this expectation of privacy when the documents were
transferred to the attorney, the placing of the documents in the attorney's hands did not
create a fifth amendment privilege. Id. at 453. However, such a legitimate expectation of
privacy coupled with his right to actual possession constituted constructive possession by the
taxpayer, so that to compel production of the documents would violate the taxpayer's fifth
amendment protection. Id. See CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSIBILrrY, EC 4-4 (1975).
53. 420 U.S. 906 (1975).
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Documents in the Hands of a Third Party
At the outset of its opinion, the Court noted that all the parties in the
case had agreed that "if the Fifth Amendment would have excused a
taxpayer from turning over the accountant's papers had he possessed
them, the attorney to whom they are delivered for the purpose of obtaining
legal advice should also be immune from subpoena."54 While the Court
agreed with this proposition for reasons discussed later in its opinion, it
held that the taxpayer's fifth amendment privilege would not excuse the
attorney from production because the taxpayer's fifth amendment privi-
lege was not violated by the enforcement of the subpoena to the attorney
to produce his client's records. 5
The Court found that the taxpayer himself was not compelled to do
anything, and that the fifth amendment only prohibits "the use of 'physi-
cal or moral compulsion' exerted on the person asserting the privilege.""6
The essential element of compulsion against the accused was lacking, as
it had been in Couch."7 The taxpayer's fifth amendment privilege was not
violated by enforcement of the subpoena directed to the attorney," regard-
less of whether the privilege would have barred a subpoena directing the
taxpayer to produce the documents while they were in his possession.5 No
constructive possession or insignificant, temporary relinquishment of pos-
session of the papers was found to exist in this situation." The taxpayer's
delivery of the records to his attorney was not any different than the
delivery of records to the accountant in Couch.'
The Court discredited the expectation of privacy language of Couch and
Boyd. 2 While noting that privacy purposes may be served by the fifth
amendment, the Court stated that not every invasion of privacy violates
the privilege against self-incrimination. 3 Under appropriate safeguards,
54. Fisher v. United States, 96 S. Ct. 1569, 1573 (1976) (emphasis in original).
55. Id. at 1573-74.
56. Id.
57. Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 336 (1973).
58. 96 S. Ct. at 1574.
59. Id. at 1573-74, 1576.
60. Id. at 1574.
61. Id. As the Court stated in Couch:
[Aictual possession of documents bears the most significant relationship to Fifth
Amendment protections against governmental compulsions upon the individual ac-
cused of crime. Yet situations may well arise where constructive possession is so clear
or the relinquishment of possession is so temporary and insignificant as to leave the
personal compulsions upon the accused substantially intact.
409 U.S. at 333.
62. See 96 S. Ct. at 1575.
63. Id.
19771
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private information obtained without compelling self-incriminating testi-
mony may be used in evidence, and "disclosure of private information may
be compelled if immunity removes the risk of incrimination."64 The fifth
amendment prohibits compelled self-incrimination, not the disclosure of
private information.65 The Court found that privacy interests are adquately
protected by the fourth amendment "or evidentiary privileges such as the
attorney-client privilege."66
Attorney-Client Privilege
Although the taxpayer relied on his fifth amendment privilege and did
not directly raise the attorney-client privilege, the Court noted that the
relevant body of law and policies that govern the attorney-client privilege
had been invoked. 7 For the attorney-client privilege to apply, the docu-
ments must have been protected in the hands of the client and must have
been transferred for the purpose of obtaining legal advice.6" Documents
that could have been obtained by court process from the client when they
were in his possession may also be obtained from the attorney to whom
they have been transferred.69 When the client himself would be privileged
from production of the documents, the attorney who has possession is not
required to produce them. 7 Thus the Court was squarely presented with
the question whether, under the fifth amendment, the documents could
have been obtained from the client while they were in his possession.7'
Documents in the Hands of the Fifth Amendment Claimant
The element of compulsion would have clearly been present had the
64. Id.
65. Id. at 1576.
66. Id.
67. Id. All parties agreed that the taxpayer should not be forced to surrender otherwise
protected documents because he had turned them over to his attorney in order to obtain legal
assistance. The lower courts have been in conflict over whether a similar privilege should be
extended to the accountant-client relationship. See generally Comment, The Fifth Amend-
ment Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in Tax Investigations, 6 TEXAs TECH U. L. REv.
1055 (1975); Tax Symposium, 2 HOFSTRA L. REV. 129 (1974).
68. Fisher v. United States, 96 S. Ct. 1569, 1576-77 (1976).
69. Id. at 1577.
70. Id. See 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2307, at 591 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
71. For a discussion of the attorney-client privilege, see Petersen, Attorney-Client Privi-
lege in Internal Revenue Service Investigations, 54 MINN. L. REV. 67 (1969). See also Note,
United States v. Kasmir: A Clarification of Fifth Amendment Rights Regarding Documents
Held by an Attorney?, 36 U. PiTT. L. REV. 728 (1975); Comment, United States v. Kasmir:
Taxpayer's Privilege Against Self-Incrimination-Accountant's Work Papers in Attorney's
Possession with Taxpayer-Client as Conduit, 10 TuLSA L.J. 646 (1975).
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subpoena been directed to the taxpayer himself.2 As the Court forcibly
stated: "A subpoena served on a taxpayer requiring him to produce an
accountant's work papers in his possession without doubt involves sub-
stantial compulsion. '7 3 The contents of the papers might even be assumed
to incriminate him, said the Court; however, the papers must be testimo-
nial as well as compelled and incriminating before a valid fifth amendment
claim can be asserted.74 The Court found that the contents of the papers
were not testimonial because the taxpayer had not prepared them. Rather,
they were the uncoerced product of the taxpayer's accountant. 5
However, the Court's fifth amendment analysis did not end here. Since
the element of compulsion would have been present, the Court probed
further, examining the act of producing the documents, and indicating
that if the "tacit averments" made in complying with a subpoena were
both incriminating and testimonial, a valid claim would be present, re-
gardless of the character of the contents of the documents. As the Court
noted:
Compliance with the subpoena tacitly concedes the existence of the papers
demanded and their possession or control by the taxpayer. It would also
indicate the taxpayer's belief that the papers are those described in the
subpoena.77
In the fact situation presented, the Court found that these implicit admis-
sions were not sufficient testimony so as to fall within the fifth amend-
ment's protection.78 Furthermore, the Court found nothing incriminating
in them, even "assuming . . .minimal testimonial significance.
7
72. Fisher v. United States, 96 S. Ct. 1569, 1580 (1976).
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. The Court attacked the lack of testimonial communication more broadly in a
footnote, where it stated:
The fact that the documents may have been written by the person asserting the
privilege is insufficient to trigger the privilege .... And, unless the Government has
compelled the subpoenaed person to write the document ... the fact that it was
written by him is not controlling with respect to the Fifth Amendment issue.
Id. at 1580 n.11 (citations omitted). Is the Court merely emphasizing the independence of
the elements of testimony, incrimination and compulsion; or is it suggesting that it is going
to take a very restrictive view of things testimonial?
76. Id. at 1580.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 1581.
79. Id.
19771
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AN EMERGING FIFTH AMENDMENT RATIONALE
When the requested documents are in the hands of the claimant, the
elements of compulsion, incrimination and testimonial communication
must all be present to invoke the protection of the fifth amendment privi-
lege. The pivotal element is compulsion. If there is no compulsion upon the
claimant, the Court's inquiry is over.
Compulsion exists in the forced production of documents by a motion
to produce or a subpoena duces tecum issued to the person claiming the
privilege."0 The compulsion must be upon the claimant, not a third person.
If the person claiming the privilege is not compelled to do something him-
self, his fifth amendment rights are not violated.8' An agency relationship
does not alter this result. 2
Possession of the documents is important in aiding the Court in evaluat-
ing whether personal compulsion has been exerted on the person claiming
the privilege, although it is not a controlling consideration. It is evident
that the compulsion requirement will be more easily met if a person is
forced to produce papers that are in his possession. Seemingly, certain
constructive possessions may be sufficient to satisfy the compulsion re-
quirement. "3
If the Court finds that there is compulsion exerted on the claimant, it
will look to see whether the claimant is compelled to make an incriminat-
ing and testimonial communication. This communication may be oral
testimony, a written statement or a communicative or assertive act." First,
the Court will examine the contents of the documents. The contents may
be either incriminating or testimonial, or both. If either of these elements
is missing, the Court will next look beyond the contents to the compelled
act of producing the papers. If the act of producing the documents is both
incriminating and testimonial, then there is a valid fifth amendment
claim. 6
This rationale in Fisher differs from that in the earlier cases in that it
80. See id. at 1574.
81. Id. Compare the holdings in Wilson, Grant and White, which seem to turn on the
elements of ownership and an expectation of privacy.
82. Id.
83. The Court in Fisher did not give further guidelines as to what would constitute con-
structive possession.
84. Fisher v. United States, 96 S. Ct. at 1579. See generally 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §
2263, at 378 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
85. 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2264, at 379-80 (McNaughton rev. 1961). See McCoRMICK,
EVIDENCE § 126, at 267-68 (1972).
86. See Fisher v. United States, 96 S. Ct. 1569, 1580-81 (1976).
[Vol. 11:653
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has completely eliminated any privacy considerations."7 Beginning with
Boyd, I and continuing through Couch, an individual's right to or expecta-
tion of privacy was a primary concern of the Court in determining whether
there was a valid fifth amendment claim. In Fisher, the Court has stated
that this will no longer be part of an inquiry into a fifth amendment
claim.3 Possession and ownership are not primary considerations under
this rationale. They are still important factors, but only when considered
in relation to the elements of compulsion, testimony and self-
incrimination.
SUBSEQUENT APPLICATION
With Fisher just decided, the Court had no problem dealing with the
fifth amendment issues presented in Andresen v. Maryland.8" While fourth
amendment questions were also presented, the Court refused to follow
the directives of Boyd and considered each issue separately and in-
dependently.9
Andresen was an attorney and a sole practitioner. During an investiga-
tion of allegations of real estate settlement fraud, his activities came under
scrutiny. Investigation disclosed that he had defrauded a purchaser. Hav-
ing obtained a warrant, police searched Andresen's office and seized cer-
tain real estate papers and files. Andresen claimed that his fourth and fifth
amendment rights had been violated.2
The Supreme Court applied the elements of the rationale developed in
Fisher to the facts of this case to determine whether Andresen's privilege
against self-incrimination had been violated. The Court found that the
search and seizure, made lawfully under the fourth amendment, 3 of state-
ments voluntarily committed to writing did not involve compulsion within
the meaning of the fifth amendment. 4 Andresen was not required to aid
87. See id. at 1575-76.
88. The Court stated the following:
Several of Boyd's express or implicit declarations have not stood the test of time
... .Purely evidentiary (but "non-testimonial") materials, as well as contraband
and fruits and instrumentalities of crime, may now be searched for and seized under
proper circumstances . . . .Also, any notion that "testimonial" evidence may never
be seized and used in evidence is inconsistent with Katz v. United States [389 U.S.
347 (1967)]. ...
96 S. Ct. at 1579 (citations and footnote omitted).
89. Id. at 1575-76.
90. 96 S. Ct. 2737 (1976).
91. See id. at 2744.
92. Id. at 2741-44.
93. Id. at 2747-50.
94. Id. at 2744-45.
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in any way in the discovery, production or authentication of evidence."
With a finding of no compulsion, the fifth amendment inquiry ended.
THE SCOPE OF THE RATIONALE
So far, the new fifth amendment rationale has only been applied to the
compelled production or seizure of business documents. The Court has not
directly addressed the question of whether the fifth amendment privilege
would be available if an individual's personal papers were involved. How-
ever, with the elimination of privacy interests as an element of inquiry, it
would seem that, absent physical or moral compulsion against the accused,
there would be no valid fifth amendment claim even in the case of strictly
personl papers." Mr. Justice Brennan, concurring in Fisher, suggested that
the majority was "laying the groundwork" for future restrictions of the
privilege even as to "private papers."" Dissenting in Andresen, he found
the fifth amendment circumvented by the Court's refusal to find compul-
sion in the defendant's non-resistance to the search. 8 He noted that what
the government cannot force the accused to produce, it can secure through
the mechanism of search and seizure. 9
In earlier decisions, the expectation of privacy was used as a measuring
device to help determine whether certain papers would be considered per-
sonal and private and, therefore, be protected by the fifth amendment. It
is now unclear what standard will apply in evaluating whether they are
private, if indeed the Court recognizes any distinction at all when next
confronted with the issue.
CONCLUSION
Fisher represents a genuine attempt by the Court to articulate its rea-
soning in fifth amendment document cases. The decision at least makes
it clear that a fifth amendment claim is not to be determined by a defen-
dant's expectations of privacy. From Andresen it seems that fourth and
fifth amendment issues will receive separate and independent analysis.
The open question is whether the rationale in Fisher will apply to the
production of materials previously called "private papers." The import-
95. Id. at 2745.
96. See Fisher v. United States, 96 S. Ct. 1569, 1590-92 (1976) (Marshall, J., concurring).
Justice Marshall stated that "the Court's approach should still focus upon the private nature
of the papers subpoenaed and protect those about which Boyd and its progeny were most
concerned." Id. at 1591.
97. Id. at 1583 (Brennan, J., concurring).
98. Andresen v. Maryland, 96 S. Ct. 2737, 2751 (1976) (Brennan, J. dissenting).
99. Id.
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ance of Fisher, and to a lesser extent Andresen, lies not in the erosion of
the principles of Boyd, but rather in what seems to be their gradual
replacement of the same.
Lucretia C. Irby

